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This paper argues that, since activities that provide political information are complementary with leisure,
increased labor market activity should lower turnout, but should do so least in prominent elections
where information is ubiquitous.  Using official county-level voting data and a variety of OLS and
TSLS models, we find that increases in wages and employment: reduce voter turnout in gubernatorial
elections by a significant amount; have no effect on Presidential turnout; and raise the share of persons
voting in a Presidential election who do not vote on a House of Representative election on the same
ballot.  We argue that this pattern (which contradicts some previous findings in the literature) can be
fully accounted for by an information argument, and is either inconsistent with or not fully explicable
by arguments based on citizens’ psychological motivations to vote in good or bad times; changes in
logistical voting costs; or transitory migration.  Using individual-level panel data methods and multiple
years’ data from the American National Election Study (ANES) we confirm that increases in employment
lead to less use of the media and reduced political knowledge, and present associational individual
evidence that corroborates our main argument.
Kerwin Kofi Charles
Harris School of Public Policy
University of Chicago













1.   Introduction  
  Given the importance of voting as an input into policy-making and as the source of the 
legitimacy of democratic government, understanding variation in the decision to vote has been 
the subject of substantial research in economics and political science.
1  Recent theoretical models 
of voting emphasize the effect of information limitations on turnout, arguing that poorly 
informed voters may abstain for strategic reasons (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996) or because 
of disutility associated with uncertainty (Matsusaka 1995), regret (Merlo 2006; Degan and 
Merlo Forthcoming), or aversion to ambiguity (Ghirardato and Katz 2002; Ashworth 2011).  The 
possibility that poorly informed people are more likely to abstain has been adduced as a possible 
explanation for well-known voting regularities, including the tendency of those with lower levels 
of education to vote less, and for “roll-off”, which is voting on only a subset of elections on the 
same ballot (Bullock and Dunn 1996; Degan and Merlo, Forthcoming).   
Empirical analysis linking turnout to information has been an active area of recent 
research.  Various observational studies find that citizens with more political information are 
more likely to vote (Palfrey and Poole 1987; Wattenberg et al. 2000; Coupe and Noury 2004). 
Laboratory studies in which research subjects are assigned information, have found similar 
evidence (Battaglini, Morton, and Palfey 2010).  The importance of the media as citizens’ 
principal source of political information in the real world is demonstrated by Snyder and 
Stromberg (2010), who show that voters living in areas with less media coverage know less 
about their representatives, who in turn are exert less effort on their constituents’ behalf.  Several 
recent analyses, studying how turnout is affected by the media and information it provides, show 
that voting rises with exogenous expansions and declines with exogenous contractions in the 
media (Gentzkow 2005; Lassen 2005; Dellavigna and Kaplan 2007; Gentzkow, Shapiro, and 
Sinkinson forthcoming; and Stromberg 2004).    
This paper examines a potential connection between information and voting that has 
received little previous attention.  We study how labor market activity affects turnout, and assess 
the extent to which this relationship is attributable to information. Our argument applies familiar 
results from labor supply theory and from work on information and voting, and yields a number 
of testable predictions.  When voters devote more of their time to activities related to market 
                                                            
1 Blais (2000) provides a comprehensive review of variation in turnout across countries, within countries across 
election types and population sub-groups, and over time for the same election.   2 
 
work they necessarily spend less time on leisure.  Since the mechanisms by which voters are 
exposed to political information, such as discussions with friends and family or using the media, 
are complementary with leisure, increased labor market activity should leave voters less 
informed and thus less likely to vote, if information accounts of voting are correct.
2   This 
negative relationship between work activity and voting should be smaller when reduced exposure 
to information sources has only a scant effect on people’s political information, as should be true 
for elections covered so extensively that knowledge about them is ubiquitous and nearly 
unavoidable.  An implication of this argument is that roll-off in voting between “bigger” and 
“smaller” elections (as suggested by the amount of information generally available about them) 
should increase as voters’ work-related activity increases.  
The first part of this paper tests these three predictions about turnout.  Our analysis 
presumes that voters consume less leisure, and are correspondingly less exposed to political 
information, when they have abundant opportunities in the labor market – that is, when wages 
and employment in their local labor market are high.  We treat the relatively small spatial area of 
a county as a labor market, and relate county wage and employment information to county-level 
turnout data that we have assembled.  Much of our analysis focuses on state gubernatorial and 
presidential elections, which are both chief executive elections for which voters in all counties in 
a state can participate, but which likely receive vastly different amounts of media attention.   
Using OLS difference estimators that account for latent county-specific effects and unobserved 
state-specific factors that vary across election years, we find that increases in mean county per 
capita earnings and mean per capita employment are associated with lower gubernatorial turnout, 
but are not related to turnout in presidential contests in a statistically significant way.   
To address potential endogeneity bias arising from compositional differences across 
counties (due, for example, to better informed voters locating in faster growing counties) and 
problems arising from possible mis-measurement of the county labor market variables, we also 
estimate Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) models.  In these models, we instrument for changes 
                                                            
2  We do not argue that people receive no political information at work.  Instead, we implicitly assume that 
information received through media exposure or other leisure-intensive activities is superior to whatever is gleaned 
from discussions with a relatively small group of co-workers.  Evidence that leisure time is spent on activities likely 
to provide information is found in recent work by Krueger and Mueller (2008), who show that consumption of a 
particular form of media (television viewing) constitutes fully one third of the “awake” time of the unemployed in 
the United States, and that compared to the employed, the unemployed spend nearly twice as much time viewing TV 
during the weekday (201 minutes vs. 106 minutes per day)  and about  30% more on weekends (209 minutes vs. 162 
minutes).  3 
 
in the two labor market measures using exogenous shocks to world oil supply, interacted with the 
prior importance of oil, natural gas, or coal production in a county. Shocks to international oil 
supplies, arising from exogenous geo-political events, induced sharp changes in domestic 
production of oil, natural gas, and coal.  Differences in endowment across counties ensured that 
international oil shocks affected labor market activity differently across counties within the same 
state.  Consistent with our expectation that any bias in the OLS estimates is towards zero, the 
TSLS results for the gubernatorial elections are of the same sign but are larger in absolute value 
than their OLS counterparts. The effects are economically significant, with the preferred TSLS 
estimates implying that a 10 percent increase (roughly a standard deviation) in county labor 
market activity between elections lowers voter turnout by between 3 to 4 percent. For 
presidential election results, by contrast, we find that both the OLS and TSLS estimates are 
statistically insignificant and close to zero in magnitude.  This pattern of results is robust to a 
number of specification checks, including alternative definitions of the instruments and different 
metrics for defining labor markets. 
 The third prediction about turnout we test is whether roll-off varies positively with labor 
market activity, a prediction we have not seen previously made or empirically tested.  To 
conduct this analysis, we need data on two types of elections that typically occur on the same 
ballot.   Most state gubernatorial elections occur in the U.S. in non-presidential election years so 
there are fewer than nine states in which these two types of elections are on the same ballot.  For 
this part of our analysis, we therefore use data on presidential and House of Representatives 
elections, which in every state occur at the same time. Using the county-level data we have 
assembled, and accounting for the econometric concerns mentioned above, we find that roll off 
between these two types of elections is indeed larger when wages and employment are high.  
This result, combined with the evidence about a negative effect of labor market activity on 
gubernatorial elections but no effect for the much more intensely covered presidential elections, 
strongly suggests that labor market activity affects turnout in a manner predicted by information-
based accounts of voting. 
What other explanations might account for the finding that labor market activity 
negatively affects turnout in some elections but not others?  Transitory cross-state migration is 
one possibility.  People moving temporarily into a new state might abstain from the state’s 
gubernatorial election because their future non-residence in that state assures that the outcome of 4 
 
the state’s gubernatorial contest has no bearing on their future well being.  At the same time, 
given the national purview of the office, voters might regard the outcome of a presidential 
election as important wherever they live and so might vote in those contests even when living in 
a state to which they have only temporarily moved.  If migrants move towards areas with 
relatively better labor market opportunities, this type of voting behavior among them might 
generate the different gubernatorial and presidential effects we estimate.
3 This  possibility  is 
particularly important for our preferred TSLS analyses, where the large changes in labor market 
opportunities across counties associated with energy price shocks might have been especially 
likely to induce substantial migration.  We use five-year migration patterns from Census county-
level summary file data to directly study cross-state migration.  We show that the migration 
associated with the energy shocks over the years studied cannot explain the difference between 
gubernatorial and presidential results. This is true even if we assume that all out of state migrants 
voted in one type of election but not the other.
4  
Another possible explanation for the finding that increased labor market activity lowers 
turnout for gubernatorial elections comes from Downs’ (1957) classic calculus of voting 
theoretical framework.  In that framework, citizens vote only if their logistical costs are exceeded 
by the utility payoff they receive from being the pivotal voter who changes the outcome of an 
election, plus any psychic payoff they get from participating in the democratic process.
5  Since 
the time cost of standing in line to vote or driving to the polls are higher when the opportunity 
cost of time is high, turnout might vary negatively with labor market activity because of 
logistical cost reasons.
6   But a logistical costs argument would suggest that there should be 
negative effects of labor market activity on turnout in all elections, including those for the 
President – something we consistently fail to find.  Even more persuasive, perhaps, is our finding 
                                                            
3 Notice that migration that permanent, within-state migration, if turnout is governed by a mechanism like the one 
described, cannot account for our findings.  If migration is permanent, then the outcome of the gubernatorial election 
in the receiving states should matter to voters, which suggests they should turnout out to vote by the logic of this 
argument.  For migration that occurs across counties within a state, voters presumably care as much about the 
outcome of the election for state-wide office of governor.  
4 Our analysis is limited to the population of U.S citizens, so international immigration likely has little effect on our 
estimated results.  
5 The instrumentalist concern noted by Downs has long been known to poorly explain observed voting behavior in 
elections with large number of voter, as each voter’s probability of being pivotal in such cases is vanishingly small 
(see Palfrey and Rosenthal 1985).  Recent theoretical work on turnout attempts to explain the presence of both 
substantial turnout and substantial abstention in the typical election with many voters. 
6 Some logistical costs, such as variation in weather, the costs of voter registration and the time of poll hours have 
been shown to affect turnout  (See Woldfinger and Rosenstone 1980). 5 
 
that the share of people who vote on only a subset of elections on the very same ballot gets larger 
in times when labor market opportunities are abundant.  Since people who leave a portion of 
their ballot blank have already incurred the logistical costs necessary to vote, larger roll-off when 
citizens are more engaged in work related activity could not be due to logistical costs, raising 
confidence in an explanation based on information exposure.  
  The paper next studies the effect of labor supply on media exposure, political 
information, and voting using individual-level data from the American National Election Study 
(ANES).  Analagous to the county-level analysis, it is necessary to account for the fact that 
individuals who have high labor supply also have high political participation or information. 
Therefore, we exploit the rarely-used panel feature of the ANES to estimate individual fixed 
effects models and find that individual-level changes in employment are negatively related to 
changes in voters’ political information, precisely as an argument of information exposure would 
predict.  Various limitations of the self-reported ANES voting data prevent us from testing some 
turnout predictions with the ANES data, but such predictions as we are able to test corroborate 
the rest of our findings. We also present some corroborative associational evidence.  After 
reproducing the familiar result that less-informed citizens are less likely to vote, we show that 
this effect is largest for political moderates – persons who existing theories of partisanship 
suggest rely most on new information for resolving political uncertainty (Achen 2005).  We also 
show that voter information about presidential elections is nearly always perfect and is much 
better than for all other contests.  This common sense result implies that exposure to information 
probably has little effect on voters’ information for presidential compared to other types of 
elections and reconciles our presidential turnout results. 
Our analysis extends several branches of existing literature. Most obviously, we add to 
the very active research program on voter information and turnout.  The paper also adds to the 
literature relating market outcomes to voting behavior. An older literature in political science 
studies turnout specifically, and tries to distinguish between two hypotheses that are based on 
more psychological arguments than the mechanisms emphasized in the economics literature.   
The “withdrawal hypothesis” (Brody and Sniderman 1977) posits that turnout should fall when 
voters experience reductions in their material circumstances because their preoccupation with 6 
 
financial concerns leads them to ignore acts like voting.
7  The “mobilization hypothesis” 
(Scholzman and Verba 1979) argues, by contrast, that voters feeling aggrieved because of 
economic difficulty will use the political mechanism to relieve those grievances and thus vote 
more.  Previous empirical work relating labor market activity to turnout has generally yielded 
mixed results, perhaps because it has not addressed the econometric issues we raise, and has 
relied on state or national correlations.
8  Our turnout results directly contradict the withdrawal 
hypothesis.  Moreover, whereas all of our turnout results, including the gubernatorial and 
presidential estimates and the results about roll-off, are explicable with the information-based 
account we emphasize, only the negative gubernatorial estimates are readily explained by an 
argument based on mobilization.     
Our work may also be read as adding to the literature on “economic voting.”  This 
literature has been contributed to by both economists and political scientists and studies the 
relationship between labor market outcomes and one specific dimension of voting behavior: the 
incumbent’s share of total votes cast.
9 
10 Turnout has not been studied in this work. The focus on 
the voter share is prompted by the controversial argument (see Stigler 1973, 1979) that voters 
may, perhaps irrationally, reward or punish politicians for the performance of the labor market.  
The information exposure argument we emphasize in our analysis of turnout is a potentially less 
controversial theoretical mechanism by which voting and labor market activity might be related.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the empirical 
specifications for the analyses of turnout.  Section 3 discusses county-level data. Section 4 
presents the county-level results, including OLS and TSLS estimates of turnout, results for 
migration and the analysis of roll-off. Section 5 presents individual level tests of information and 




7  Why agents should be more likely to turn to political action to correct or seek redress for bad outcomes than they 
are to turn to political action to reward politicians for good outcomes is not clear, although Lau (1985) suggests that 
there might be “negativity bias” in political behavior.  
8 Rosenstone (1982) finds that turnout varies positively with economic conditions at the national level, but other 
work finds that the positive relationship between turnout and labor market performance is unstable in the US 
(Southwell 1988; Arcelus and Meltzer 1975) and is non-monotone in national time series data (Radcliff 1992). 
9 See Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000), and Hibbs (2005) for reviews of the economic voting literature. 
10 While not part of the economic voting literature, there is also a growing literature studying how economic 
conditions affect support for redistributive and other policies.  A notable example of recent work in this area is 
Brunner, Ross and Washington (2011), who study official ballot returns in California. 7 
 
2.       Organizing  Framework  and  Empirical Specification for Analysis of 
 Turnout 
 
  This section provides a conceptual overview of our reduced form analysis of turnout and 
labor market activity.  Our framework assumes that a citizen votes when his various benefits 
from voting exceeds his various voting costs.  Existing theory suggests what these costs and 
benefits are.  Downs’ (1957) classic framework posits two possible benefits from voting: an 
instrumentalist payoff equal to the voter’s utility from changing the election outcome times the 
probability that his vote is pivotal in determining the outcome (a payoff which must be zero in 
large elections like those we study in this paper); and a psychic payoff from discharging his civic 
obligation.  Recent theoretical models of voting, including models with strategically 
sophisticated but differentially informed voters (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996) and models of 
expressive voting with disutility from uncertainty, regret, or ambiguity aversion (see Matsusaka 
1995, Merlo 2006, Ghirardato and Katz 2002, Ashworth 2011) stress the role of limited 
information.  In these models, voters derive utility from participation but will abstain unless they 
are sufficiently well informed.  The theoretical literature therefore suggests that voters confront 
logistical cost of voting,  , L C such as standing in line or driving to the polls, and various costs 
associated with the lack of knowledge associated with derive from limited information, which we 
refer to by the catch-all term uncertainty costs,  . U C   
  Our empirical analysis hinges on the hypothesis that the two types of voting costs 
identified in the theoretical literature depend on a voter’s labor market activity, 01 . h <<We 
assume that at date t in location k  there are specific set of logistical challenges  ( ) , g tk, such as 
traffic or weather. The logistical cost faced by a voter at that place and time may be written as 
  ( ) ,, L Ca h g t kϕ = +  (1) 
where ϕ  represents idiosyncratic individual factors. The parameter  0 a >  captures the fact that 
logistical hurdles impose greater burdens on persons more heavily involved in market work.  A 
voters’ uncertainty costs depend on the information generally available about an election e 
occurring at a given time and place,  ( ) ,, ; Ie tk and by the voter’s exposure to that political 8 
 
information, which we assume varies negatively with his labor market activity.
11   We  write  
uncertainty costs as  
  ( ) ( ) 1, , , U Cb h I e t k ζ =−+ +  (2) 
where  ζ  represents  idiosyncratic  determinants of uncertainty. The parameter  10 b −< < , 
implying that increases in available information lower uncertainty costs, with an effect that is 
smaller the more time the voter spends on market work rather than on leisure-intensive activities 
like consuming media.   
Let  ω ζϕ =+  represent all the idiosyncratic determinants of a voter’s voting costs. 
Recalling that a citizen votes if  , L U D CC >+  the probability that the citizen votes (or, 
equivalently, the share of citizens who vote),  ,
e
kt V  is given by 
  () ( ) ( ) () ( ) ,, ,, , ,
e
kt V F D ha g tk b I etk I etk ω =− − −  (3) 
where  F ω   is the cdf of the distribution from which ω   is drawn. For illustrative simplicity, 
assume ω  is distributed Uniform [] 0,1 .   Then, from (3), the marginal effect of greater labor 
market activity on turnout is  
  () ( ) () ,, , 0 .
e
kt V






Expression (4) says that there should be a negative (or at least, non-positive) relationship 
between labor market activity and turnout in a given local area, and that this effect should differ 
across elections for which there is a priori reason to suppose there are differences in available 
information, as summarized by  () ,, . Ie kt       
  In general,  (4) combines the effect of work activity operating through logistical costs and 
the effect operating through information exposure. Notice, however, that if there were two 
elections, say e  and  , e   occurring at precisely the same time within a given location and 
appearing on the same ballot, the effect of an increase in labor market activity on the difference 
in turnout across those elections could not be a function of any logistical voting hurdles since 
these are precisely the same for the two elections.  That is,   
                                                            
11 It bears repeating that we do not deny that people may get information at politics about work. Instead, we merely 
argue that leisure intensive activities like watching the media, talking with friends or attending political events are 
likely provide more information than that from co-workers. 9 
 
  ( )
() ( ) () () () () () () () , ,, , ,, ,, ,,
ee
kt kt VV
a gtk b Iekt a gtk b Iekt bIekt Iekt
h
∂−
=− − + − = −
∂
  (5) 
depends only on the difference in available information about the two elections.   The number of 
people who “roll-off” between a “bigger” and “smaller” election on the same ballot – the 
difference 
ee
kt kt VV −    - should get larger as labor market activity increases. This effect is due 
exclusively to the effect of labor market activity on uncertainty costs and would have nothing to 
do with logistical costs.    
  To study these predictions empirically, we choose the following empirical specification 
for voter turnout,  , kst V  among citizens in county k  and state s for an election at date t for which 
all voters in the state are eligible to participate:  
 
*
01 2 . kst kst kst k st kst VX h β ββ δ π η =+ + +++  (6) 
In (6),  kst X   is a vector of observed county-level determinants of turnout, and  kst η is an 
independent, mean-zero statistical error. The vector  k δ   represents unobserved, fixed 
characteristics of counties that determine turnout.  The state×year fixed effects  st π  capture the 
effect of state-specific factors for a given election; the quality of challengers, or the amount of 
advertising dollars spent in the state, are examples of the type of confound that apply for every 
county in a state, differentially by election year.  It is worth noting that the ability to account for 
state×year specific factors is an important advantage of using county-level rather than state-level 
data.  These various fixed effects, and the vector of observable controls are meant to account for 
most systematic determinants of turnout.  
We wish to estimate  2 : β  how labor market activity, 
* , kst h   in a county causally affects 
turnout, net of anything occurring elsewhere the state or nationally.   We expect this relationship 
to be non-positive for any given election, and more negative for elections with smaller amounts 
of general information,  () ,, . Ie tk  We do not observe information generally available about any 
election, but we study two types of elections with state-wide voting for which it is plausible to 
assume large differences in information generally available about them: gubernatorial and 
presidential elections.  One problem with estimating  2 β  using (6) is endogeneity bias, arising 
from the fact that labor market activity in a county is likely systematically associated with 
unobserved county-specific factors,  . k δ  Latent political activism or the political sophistication of 10 
 
persons in the county are examples of this type of confound.  In addition, as denoted by the star 
on the variable in (6), indicators of county labor market activity are likely measured with error, 
leading to possible attenuation bias in the estimates of bias  2. β     
Consider a differenced version of (6), where  k Δ  represents the county-level difference 
across consecutive election years in a given variable:  
 
*
01 2 . k kst k kst k kst k st k kst VX h β ββ π η Δ = + Δ + Δ +Δ +Δ  (7) 
Equation (7) is purged of the effects of any latent county-specific factors that are fixed over time, 
and also controls for state-specific considerations that change across elections.  The difference 
estimator (7) might not deal with all endogeneity concerns if changes in local labor market 
activity are correlated with changes in unmeasured local factors that affect voting behavior 
() ()
* cov , 0 . k kst k kst E η ΔΔ≠   This could arise, for example, if counties experiencing growth in 
earnings see changes in the political sophistication of their residents.   Another potential problem 
with (7) is that it might exacerbate attenuation bias associated with the mis-measurement of 
county labor market conditions relative to the level regression (see Bound et al. 2001).   
To deal with both of these potential concerns, we conduct a Two Stage Least Squares 
(TSLS) analysis of the difference estimate in (7), in which we instrument for county-specific 
changes in labor market activity, 
*
kk s t h Δ .  There are two pieces to our instrument: exogenous 
shocks to international oil supply; and the degree to which, because of exogenous endowments, 
counties differ with respect to their historical production of oil, natural gas, and coal.  Shocks to 
world oil supply associated with international geo-political events, spur changes in U.S. 
production of oil, natural gas, and coal.  Differences in endowment across counties ensure that 
international supply shocks generate differential changes in county labor market activity across 
counties in the same state.  Our instruments for between-election changes in county-level labor 
market activity are variants of the product    
  ( ) _ R I county size Δ×  (8) 
where  R Δ is a measure of the international energy shock between election years, and 
() _ I county size  is a set of indicator variables  denoting the importance of oil or coal production 11 
 
in the county.
12 The TSLS analysis estimates (7), with the change in measures of local labor 
activity replaced by the predicted value from the regression  
  ( )
*
01 2 3 _ k kst k kst k st k kst h a a R I county size a X a e π Δ= + Δ × + Δ + Δ+ Δ (9) 
  The TSLS estimates identify the causal effect of labor market activity on turnout, so long 
as the exclusion restriction is satisfied – that is, so long as the only mechanism by which 
exogenous shocks to international oil supply affect turnout in a county is through labor market 
activity in the county.  There is, of course, no way to formally test whether the exclusion 
restriction holds, but below we discuss and provide direct evidence showing that migration 
induced by cross-market differences in labor market opportunity - the most likely reason for 
concern about failure of the exclusion restriction -  does not matter importantly for our results. 
     
3.    Data for County Turnout Analysis 
  Throughout, we use two indicators of county labor market activity: log per capita 
earnings and log total employment per adult.   The Bureau of Economic Analysis's Regional 
Economic Information System (REIS) provides annual county-level data on earnings and 
employment beginning in 1969. Earnings include wage and salary disbursements, other labor 
income, and proprietors' income. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) compiles REIS wage and 
salary disbursements and employment data using ES-202 filings collected as part of the state 
unemployment insurance program.   The REIS data on county wages and employment are known 
to be measured with some error.
13  Our analysis controls for both the level and age distribution of 
county population.  We obtain county population information disaggregated by age, sex, and race 
                                                            
12 Other authors have used energy shocks to isolate variation in local labor market outcomes. Black et al (2002) use 
only coal shocks to study disability payments; Acemoglu et al (2009) study the impact of oil price shocks on areas in 
the South with large oil wells to study health spending.   Wolfers (2002), using aggregate state data, tests whether 
voters are rational by observing whether the share of their votes going to an incumbent increase following after 
energy shocks.  Wolfer’s analysis differs from our analysis in that does not study turnout and uses aggregate state 
data.  
13  Some employers with establishments in multiple counties may only report wages and employment ES-202 
information at the state-level. These reports are allocated back to counties based on their industry level distribution 
by county among employers reporting at the county-level, generating some measurement error.  In addition, 
components of other labor income and proprietors income such as pension plan contributions, health and life 
insurance contributions, and  private worker's compensation contributions are only collected at the state-level and 
also use an allocation rule to determine county-level totals.  Documentation for REIS sources are available on-line 
http://www.bea.gov/regional/docs/cd.cfm 12 
 
from the Census Bureau, which reports this data beginning in 1970.
14  Unfortunately, population 
age distribution information before 1980 is limited to five-year age bands (0 to 4, 5 to 9, etc.). 
Our estimates of the number of voting age individuals in a county is therefore calculated as the 
number of individuals aged 20 and over. 
Our analysis of state-wide elections focuses on gubernatorial and presidential elections 
between 1969 and 2000. We compile county-level voting information on these elections from 
various sources.  For elections between 1969-1990 we use data from the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) “General Election Data for the United 
States, 1950-1990” (ICPSR study no. 13).  For years beyond 1990 we assembled data from the 
CQ Press Voting and Elections Collection. We have systematically verified, and corrected when 
necessary, outlier values for voter turnout as well as missing data from both data sources. These 
corrections are detailed in the Data Appendix.  We use data for all states except Alaska, Hawaii, 
and Louisiana which are excluded for reasons detailed in the Data Appendix.  Voter turnout at 
the county-level is constructed by dividing the total number of votes cast in an election by the 
Census estimate of the number of individuals ages 20 and over residing in the county. 
The TSLS part of our analysis focuses on the effect of energy supply shocks in oil and 
coal producing counties in “coal” and “oil” states.  Following Black et al. (2002), we define the 
“coal” states to be Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia – the states that span the 
country’s large coal seam.   The eleven “oil” states are those with at least 1 percent of annual 
state wages in the 1974 County Business Patterns (CBP) in the oil/natural gas industry.
15   We 
create estimates of the oil/natural gas and coal industry employment in these states using two-
digit CBP information from 1974.
16   We define counties as “small”, “medium” or “large” 
producers of oil and coal based on whether their 1974 total employment share in oil and gas 
production or in coal is, respectively, less than 5%, at least 5% and less than 20%, or at least 
20%.   The maps in Appendix Figure 1, which depict the distribution of “large”, “medium” and 
                                                            
14 These data are available on-line at http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/.  We impute 1969 county population 
information by using the 1970 population data. 
15 These states are Colorado, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, 
and Wyoming.  As noted earlier, our analysis does not include Alaska so it is not part of this list.  See Appendix 
Table 1 for summary of importance of oil and coal states in “oil” and “coal” states. 
16 See Data Appendix for details of how we construct estimates of importance of oil or coal employment share from 
CBP data. 13 
 
“small” oil and coal producing counties, illustrate the tremendous variation in the importance of 
oil and coal across counties in these states.   It is this variation that the TSLS analysis exploits.
17    
We obtain data on energy prices from the Energy Information Administration's Annual 
Energy Review.
18  Our TSLS strategy focuses on the years 1969 to 1990, a period of two large 
exogenous shocks to the world oil supply: the OPEC oil embargo following the Yom Kippur 
War; and the period from the end of 1979 to early 1981, following the overthrowing of the Shah 
of Iran and the start of the Iran-Iraq War.
19   These events affected both the prices of oil, coal and 
natural gas, and the employment in these industries in the U.S., as Figure 1 illustrates.   
Oil prices doubled between 1973 and 1974, were stable for several years, then increased 
fourfold over a two year period.    Prices fell sharply over the next four years to levels in the mid-
1980s that were slightly lower than those of mid-1970s.   Coal prices doubled between 1973 and 
1976 but then fell consistently over the next two decades, returning by the late 1990s to 1970s 
levels.   Real natural gas prices followed a very similar pattern to that for oil prices: a fivefold 
increase between 1970 and the early 1980s, then a decline of more than half over the next 6 
years.  The second panel of the figure shows that national employment in the oil/natural gas and 
coal industries closely tracked the movement in prices, with the noteworthy difference that 
national employment was not kept artificially flat during various periods, as was true for oil 
prices in two periods in the 1970s because of policy decisions.
20  Since changes in resource 
prices over our sample period are not exclusively the result of energy supply shocks, we use 
national employment as our main measure of the energy supply shock when constructing our 
instrument.
21       
                                                            
17 Importantly, although we characterize states as either “oil” or “coal”, in the empirical work we measure the 
importance of both oil and coal in the counties in these states, regardless of whether the county falls is in a state we 
call an oil state or coal state. For example, 40% of the mining in the “coal” state of West Virginia is devoted to oil 
and gas. Similarly, 15% of the mining in the “oil” state of North Dakota is in coal.   
18 Oil prices are the U.S. average first purchase price per barrel, natural gas prices are the wellhead price per 
thousand cubic feet, and coal prices are the total price per short ton. National oil and gas industry and coal industry 
employment is taken from CBP data.   
19 In 1967, when OPEC had a very similar policy response after the Six Day War, the effect on the price of oil was 
small and fleeting. In the early 1970s, however, with so much of oil used in the West imported from the Middle 
East, matters were quite different.    
20 Since the early 1900s, oil production in U.S. has been overseen by various state regulatory boards, such as the 
Oklahoma Corporations Commission, the Louisiana Conservation Commission and, most importantly, the Texas 
Railroad Commission.  Although the specific language outlining each board’s functions and objectives differ from 
state to state, these agencies set limits on level of extraction and exploration in their particular states so as to 
stabilize price, and prevent over-exploitation of oil reserves. 
21 Our results are robust to alternative specifications of the instruments, including results using the international oil 
price as the measure of the shock. 14 
 
Table 1 summarizes turnout and labor market outcomes for the counties in our sample.  For 
elections between 1969 and 2000, turnout across all counties in the U.S. averaged approximately 
55% in presidential elections, and 43% in gubernatorial elections.  As can be seen from the 
number of elections/years observations, the overwhelming majority of gubernatorial elections 
during this time period occur in non-presidential years.  Average turnout in the oil and coal states 
used for the TSLS portion of our analysis, during the years of the energy “boom” (when prices 
and production rose sharply) and “bust” (when prices and production sharply fell), is very similar 
to mean turnout for the country as a whole over the entire 1969-2000 period.   The table also 
shows that both county earnings per capita and employment per adult were slightly lower in the 
oil and coal sample than in the rest of the country over the entire period studied. 
4.    County Turnout Results 
4.1  OLS Presidential and Gubernatorial Estimates 
Table 2 presents estimates of specifications based on equations (6) and (7).  This table 
presents results for all counties in our full sample over the period 1969-2000.  The estimates in 
column (a) are from pooled cross-sectional regressions based on equation (6) in which county 
voter turnout is regressed on a county labor market measure controlling separately for state fixed 
effects and year fixed effects, as opposed to state×year fixed effects, and excluding county fixed 
effects. Column (b) presents difference estimates based on equation (7) in which the change in 
county voter turnout is regressed on the change in the relevant labor market outcome, in order to 
account for county fixed effects.  These regressions include year effects.  The regressions in 
column (c) estimate the full specification shown in (7) by replacing the year effects from column 
(b) with state×year fixed effects.  The movement from (a) to (b) reflects the importance of 
controlling for fixed county characteristics; the movement from columns (b) to (c) shows the 
importance of factors specific to that particular state×year.  We present results separately for 
gubernatorial and presidential elections. Finally, this and all similar tables that follow present 
separate results for our two measures of labor market conditions (log of per capita earnings and 
log of employment per adult), so each entry in the table is from a different regression.    
The table shows that in pooled OLS models that control separately for state and time 
effects, more labor market activity in a county is associated with higher voter turnout.  The 
estimated effects are strongly statistically significant for both gubernatorial and presidential 15 
 
elections and for both indicators of labor market activity.  The results in (a) are contrary to the 
predicted relationship discussed above, but this specification does not account for either fixed 
local confounds or state-year specific effects.
22 When we account for county-fixed effects in the 
difference estimator in column (b), the results are quite different.  In particular, the positive point 
estimates from the level equation become negative for the gubernatorial elections in these 
difference models and both effects are statistically significant.  For presidential elections, 
estimating the difference model effectively takes the point estimates to zero for both labor 
market measures.  Adding state×year effects to the difference model sharply lowers the 
magnitude of the various effects, as shown in column (c).  It is interesting that the point estimates 
for the gubernatorial elections remain negative (although only one is significant), while those for 




4.2  Two Stage Least Squares Presidential and Gubernatorial Estimates  
We have noted that estimates from the difference models above might be contaminated 
by measurement error and endogeneity bias, which would tend to bias the negative estimates  of 
labor market activity towards 0 (in the case of measurement error) or even through 0 (in the case 
of endogenity bias).
24  Our TSLS analysis addresses both of these concerns.   
  The validity of the TSLS analysis depends on whether exogenous energy supply shocks 
affected changes in county labor market outcomes based on the importance of oil or coal 
production in the county.  Table 3 presents the first stage regressions (9) for counties in the oil 
and coal sample, with each column in the table representing a different regression.  The results in 
panels A and B show that both oil and coal shocks (measured as the change in national 
employment in these industries) differentially affected changes in county log per capita earnings 
                                                            
22 The pooled results reproduce the finding of the work in political science which is based on more aggregate data 
and so does not control for unobserved fixed effects (see Rosenstone 1982).  As we discuss later, attempts to relate 
labor market activity and voting using individual level data several problem, but an especially important one is the 
paucity of individual panel data on voting which makes it difficult to control for latent person fixed effects – the 
analog of fixed county effects in our analysis. 
23 This basic pattern of results remains the same under various alternative specifications, including those in which 
we use the mean of labor market conditions in the two years preceding the relevant election as the measure of 
county labor market performance. 
24 Since better educated and richer people are generally more likely to vote, we would expect that counties in which 
income or unobserved dimensions of human capital were growing would also exhibit growth in the likelihood of 
voting for other reasons. 16 
 
and log employment per adult in counties where the production of the resource was a “small”, 
“medium” or “large” share of overall employment.   For example, the point estimates of 0.108 
and 0.281 in the first column of panel A imply that a 10% increase in national coal employment 
increases per capita earnings in medium and large coal counties by 1 and 3 percent, respectively, 
compared to small coal counties.  We find similar differential effects in large and medium 
relative to small counties for oil supply shocks (the bottom pair of point estimates in each 
column); for both measures of labor market performance; and across the different years in which 
the two types of elections are held. Notice also that F-statistics are all larger than the threshold of 
10 that has been emphasized in the “weak instruments” literature (Staiger and Stock 1997). 
Before moving to the TSLS estimates, we present reduced form results where the change in 
voter turnout is regressed directly on the exogenous instruments.   These results, presented in 
Panel C of Table 3, demonstrate both that energy shocks have a larger impact on voter turnout in 
counties in which employment is more dependent on energy production and that these shocks 
affect gubernatorial turnout but not presidential turnout.  We find that positive shocks to both oil 
and coal production significantly lowered voter turnout in “large” counties relative to “small” or 
“medium” counties for gubernatorial elections.  By contrast, the presidential results indicate that 
oil shocks had no differential effect on voter turnout across counties; and coal shocks led to 
increased turnout but did so more in medium than in large counties.  
  Table 4 presents OLS and TSLS estimates of the effect of changes in the two labor 
market measures on the change in voter turnout for the sample of oil and coal counties over the 
energy boom/bust years.  The TSLS estimates of labor market performance on turnout are 
negative and, in all but one case, strongly statistically significant for gubernatorial elections.  The 
fact that these estimates are larger (in absolute value) than the negative OLS point estimates 
suggests that measurement error and endogeneity bias affect the latter results in the manner 
earlier described.   The difference between the gubernatorial elections and the presidential results 
is very striking.  For presidential elections, both of the TSLS point estimate are positive but 
neither is statistically different from zero– just as was the case in the OLS results. 
How large are these estimated effects?  Applying the TSLS estimates to all of the 
counties in the full sample, the coefficient of -0.138 for log earnings per capita in the 
gubernatorial regressions implies that a county experiencing a one standard deviation change in 
log earnings per capita of 0.113 log points has a reduction in voter turnout between elections of 17 
 
1.6 percentage points.  At our estimate of -0.318, a county experiencing a one standard deviation 
change in log employment per adult of 0.061 log points has a decline in voter turnout of 1.9 
percentage points.  Alternatively, we can estimate the impact of labor market fluctuations on 
voter turnout during the energy boom and bust.  In large oil producing counties, log per capita 
earnings changed by 0.4 log points and log employment per adult by roughly 0.2 log points over 
the boom and bust cycle.  In large coal counties, log per capita earnings changed by 0.25 log 
points and log employment per adult by roughly 0.1 log points.  Given these swings in earnings 
and employment, our estimates imply that changes in labor market activity changed turnout by 
between 5.5 and 6.3 percentage points, respectively, in large oil counties and between 3.2 and 
3.3 percentage points in large coal counties.  Relative to the mean of 43% across all 
gubernatorial elections in the U.S., our implied effects are therefore quite economically 
significant.  
 
4.3  Roll-Off and Labor Market Activity 
As discussed in Section 2, results relating labor market activity and turnout necessarily 
conflate any effect of labor market activity on logistical (or, shoe-leather) costs, and any effects 
operating through information exposure and uncertainty.  However, if variation in shoe leather 
costs mattered importantly for our results, increases in this type of cost should lower turnout for 
both gubernatorial and presidential elections, yet we consistently fail to find evidence of any 
negative effect on presidential turnout in any of the preceding estimates.
 25 
 To formally assess the possible importance of an effect of market activity on turnout that 
operates through logistical costs, we study roll-off between presidential and House of 
Representative elections, which for a given area occur on the same ballot and on the same day.
 26 
Since logistical costs cannot explain the decision to vote in only one of these elections, variation 
                                                            
25 Another reason to doubt that this type of cost appreciably lowers turnout is plausibility: it not obvious that the few 
minutes citizens must stand in line to vote are high enough to prevent people from voting.  
26 Recall that to study roll-off we need to focus on different types of elections occurring at the same time and in 
places where we can use the instrumental variables that allow us to account for measurement error and endogeneity 
bias in TSLS analyses. These requirements invalidate gubernatorial/Presidential voting for this part of our analysis. 
During the years under study, gubernatorial and Presidential elections occur at the same time in only 9 states.  
Moreover, for only 4 of these states do we have measures of the instrumental variables used in our analysis. See the 




in exposure to information associated with changes in labor market activity is the most plausible 
explanation for any finding that roll-off varies systematically with voters’ market activity.  An 
information based account of voting predicts that the number of people who vote in the more 
widely covered election (the presidential contest) but do not vote in the election with less media 
coverage (the House of Representatives) should increase as labor market activity increases.   
We estimate models of the form  
 
*
01 2 . k kst k kst k kst k st k kst RO X h β ββ π η Δ= + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ  (10) 
where  , kk s t x Δ
* , kk s t h Δ and  ks t π Δ  represent, as before, county-level changes in observed county 
characteristics, labor market conditions, and state×year fixed effects and  kk s t η Δ  is the change in a 
mean-zero error.  The outcome variable  kst RO  measures roll-off in a given presidential election 
year:  the difference in share of persons voting in presidential and House elections, or 
PH
kst kst kst RO V V =−.      
Table 5  presents three sets of estimates: OLS county-level difference results on all 
counties over all the years in our sample; OLS county-level difference results for the oil and coal 
counties over the “boom” and “bust” years; and TSLS estimates from the latter sample and years.    
Each entry in the table presents results from a different regression.   Taken as a whole, the results 
indicate that the share of people who vote in a presidential election but not in a House election on 
the same ballot increases when the labor market is performing better.  All of the point estimates 
are positive and increase when we instrument for the labor market measure, consistent with the 
likely nature of measurement error and endogeneity biased. For the log per capita earnings 
measure, the point estimates are statistically significant, and are economically meaningful 
relative to the mean of the dependent variable.  Although none of the point estimates for the 
employment per adult measure are statistically significant, we find it reassuring that all are 
positive and generally move in the same direction as the earnings measure.  Since this finding 
that roll-off rises with increases in labor market activity cannot be the result of changes in 
logistical costs, we think it strongly suggests that the negative effect between turnout and labor 
market activity (in some elections) mainly reflects the effect of greater labor market activity on 




4.4 Robustness  Analyses   
Alternative Specifications  
  We conduct a number of robustness analyses for the county turnout results.  In one set of 
tests, we use alternative specifications of the instrument.  For example, we use changes in coal 
and oil price instead of changes in national employment in oil and coal.  Also, the main 
specification defines the importance of oil and coal production in a county using CBP data from 
1974, which is the earliest years for which two-digit data are available. Because these 1974 
numbers might partly reflect endogenous responses to oil shocks (the first of which occurred in 
1972/73), we use one-digit 1967 CBP data to create an alternative measure of the importance of 
county oil and coal employment.  Reassuringly, our TSLS results are robust to these alternative 
ways of defining the instrument.
27  
  In another robustness exercise, we estimate OLS difference models similar to those 
above, but use data for geographic areas larger than counties: State Economic Areas (SEA) and 
Economic Sub Regions (ESR).
28   There are three benefits to estimating these models.  First, 
OLS difference models using data from these larger geographic areas do not depend on the 
energy shock instruments in any way. So, unlike the county TSLS estimates, they are impervious 
to concerns about a violation of exclusion restriction of the energy shock instrument in the 
turnout estimates (the possibility that energy shocks changed voting through mechanism other 
than labor market activity).   Second, measurement error is certain to be smaller with this more 
aggregated data than with the smaller county measures.   Third, since both SEAs and ESRs are 
subsumed within states, models using these data can control for state×year fixed effects, which 
we have shown to be important determinants of turnout.   
  Of course, there are disadvantages of using data for these larger geographic areas.  We 
are interested in how turnout is affected by voters’ own labor market activity, for which we 
believe indicators of labor market opportunity in voters’ specific local labor markets provide 
good proxies.  The larger the geographic area used to define a “labor market”, the greater the 
likelihood that our estimates capture how labor activity in areas outside of where a voter lives 
and works affects voting.  Economic activity in areas outside of a voter’s own labor market does 
                                                            
27 See Appendix Table 2 for these robustness results. 
28 SEAs are aggregate economic units originally developed for the 1950 Census which consist of either a single 
county or a set of contiguous counties which do not cross state lines (Bogue 1951), and ESRs are  aggregations of 
SEAs. Most states have between 6 to 11 times the number of SEAs as counties.   20 
 
not affect the voter’s own time allocation or economic wellbeing, but might still be related to 
voting – possibly through some “socio-tropic” concerns.
 29   Any such effect would have nothing 
do with changes in voting associated with time allocation, whether because of changes in 
logistical costs or exposure to information. In addition, in analyses performed on data aggregated 
to larger geographic areas it is not possible for formally account for the various local (county-
specific) unobserved factors,  , k δ   that clearly affect turnout.  Despite these concerns, it is 
instructive to see how OLS regressions based on data from larger geographic areas compare to 
our preferred TSLS county-level results.   
Table 6  shows that the OLS difference estimates with SEA and ESR data are, for 
gubernatorial elections, substantially larger than the corresponding OLS county-level estimates 
in Table 3.  This is precisely what we would expect if the smaller measurement error from using 
these more aggregate data reduces attenuation bias.   Although these point estimates are negative 
and larger than the corresponding OLS estimates, not all of them are statistically significant.  
Interestingly, for these regressions as well we find very different results for presidential 
elections: none of the presidential effects is statistically significant; and most are positive but 
very small, especially in comparison to the gubernatorial results.   It bears repeating that we do 
not attach the same causal interpretation to these estimates that we do to the preceding results, 
for the reasons already mentioned.  Nonetheless, we find it reassuring that these estimates 
support the conclusions drawn from the earlier main results: for gubernatorial elections, 
improvements in labor market conditions lead to reductions in voter turnout; turnout in 
presidential elections, by contrast, is either unaffected by changes in local labor market 
conditions or else exhibits a small positive response.  
 
Migration 
  An important consideration that might affect the causal interpretation we place on the 
foregoing estimates is transitory internal migration associated with local economic shocks.     
Suppose that migrants sort temporarily into areas where labor market conditions are improving.  
Suppose further that migrants do not vote in elections dominated by local concerns because they 
are either unfamiliar with those concerns or regard them as irrelevant, given their temporary 
                                                            
29 Unlike the individual-based accounts of voting that dominate the literature, socio-tropic models voting posit that 
voting decisions are based, in part, how politician performance in office affects people other than the voter himself 
(Kinder and Kiewiet 1981).  21 
 
residence in the area.  Finally, suppose that migrants continue to vote in elections whose 
outcomes are relevant to them wherever they live in the future.   Local labor market activity and 
voter turnout would then be negatively related in gubernatorial or House of Representative 
elections, the outcomes of which are relevant only for people who are from or plan to live in the 
state in the future.  At the same time, these same variables might exhibit no systematic 
relationship to turnout in presidential elections, about which voters are presumably interested 
wherever in the country they live.   In this scenario, the TSLS estimates could be identifying the 
effect of migration associated with energy shocks rather than how labor market activity changes 
turnout among a given set of voters.   
  We estimate negative effects of labor market activity on turnout for two gubernatorial 
elections and in the House of Representative roll-off analysis.  With respect to the gubernatorial 
estimates, the concern about migration is important only insofar as migration is from outside the 
state; migrants across different counties within a state presumably care about the outcomes of the 
state-wide gubernatorial election.  Similarly, for House of Representative elections, the concern 
is important for migration to or from areas outside the Congressional District, which is spatial 
unit (typically a collection of several counties) within a state over which these elections are 
contested. Unfortunately, no data source exists with which it is possible to track migration across 
Congressional districts. However, we can study within- and out-of-state migration over the 
period of the energy price shocks. 
The interval of what we have called the energy “boom” and “bust” over which the TSLS 
results are estimated is approximately 1970 to 1990.   This is fortunate, as we can use the 
question from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 Censuses about where the respondent lived five years 
previously to determine how the share of the population new to a county changed across oil and 
coal counties over the energy “boom” (1970-1980) and “bust” (1980-1990) periods.  These 
measures are available at the county-level in Census summary files.
30  The first two columns in 
Table 7  show how the share of residents who had lived in a different county five years 
previously changed differentially in large and medium, compared to small counties.  We find that 
during the boom, large and medium coal and oil producing counties experienced increases in the 
share of their residents who had lived in a different county five years previously, and that these 
counties experienced a reduction in the share of such persons during the period of the energy 
                                                            
30 See Data Appendix for further details about Census data used in migration analysis. 22 
 
bust.  Again, these estimates represent comparisons to small producing counties – precisely the 
comparisons on which the TSLS estimates are based. 
The results in the second pair of columns, which examine the change in the share of a 
county’s residents who lived in another state five years previously, reveal a different pattern. We 
find that during the energy boom there was no statistically significant change in oil or coal 
counties’ shares of out of state residents compared to changes in small producing counties.  And, 
the reduction in the share of state migration during the bust was only a fraction of the overall 
relative reduction in the share of persons who from another county. Thus, whereas the energy 
supply shocks did indeed occasion greater in- and out-migration into the “large” and “medium” 
oil and coal producing counties compared to “small” ones, the overwhelming majority of that 
relative migration difference involved people from within the state. Given this, and presuming 
that all residents of a state have an interest in state-wide elections irrespective of which county 
they live in, these results suggest that the negative gubernatorial county results are not driven by 
migration.   
We can bound the possible effect of migration on the TSLS turnout estimates over the 
boom (when there was no relative out of state migration difference into small, medium and large 
counties) and bust (when the statistically significant out-of-state migration differences are small).  
Suppose we make the unrealistic assumption that all out of state migrants into a county do not 
vote in gubernatorial elections because they did not know or care about these elections in the 
state to which they move.  The results imply that of the 6.3 estimated percentage point change in 
turnout over the boom/bust cycle in large oil counties from the TSLS estimates, at most only 1.7 
percentage points is attributable to migration.  Similarly, for large and medium coal states, 
observed changes in migration cannot explain more than one-third of the 3.3 percentage point 
swing in gubernatorial turnout arising from changes in labor market activity over the boom/bust 
cycle in large or medium coal counties.   As noted above, we cannot conduct the same sort of 
analysis for migration across congressional districts for the House of Representatives results, but 
this direct migration evidence suggests that this is mechanism does not appreciably affect the 





5.    Individual Level Evidence on Information, Voting and Employment  
  The various county-level turnout results are jointly consistent with the notion that 
increased labor market activity reduces voters’ exposure to political information, increases their 
uncertainty about some elections, and lowers turnout in those elections.  In this section, we 
present direct evidence on such aspects of this mechanism as we are able to using individual 
level data.   
Suppose that the individual labor supply  ist h  of a person i living in state s at time t  is 
related to the various outcomes of interest  ist y  (information or knowledge, media exposure and 
voting) according to the regression model     
  01 2 , ist ist ist i st ist yx h λ λλα π ν =+ + ++ +   (11) 
where  ist x is a vector of individual level  observables,  i α  is a un-observed fixed person effect,  st π  
is a vector of state×year fixed effects and  ist ν  is an error term.  The person effect  i α  is analogous 
to the fixed county effect  k δ  in the county-level turnout analysis, and captures the fact that the 
outcomes y  are partly determined by unobserved individual traits that also affect the likelihood 
of being employed at any point in time.  Failure to account for this would tend to bias estimates 
of the parameter  2. λ  The natural way to account for these latent confounds would be to apply 
fixed effects methods to (11), which requires that the data source from which we obtain 
individual level data on labor supply, information, media exposure and voting must have a 
longitudinal feature, in which the same individual is interviewed across successive election years 
and asked about the relevant variables in both years.   
  We use data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) Cumulative Data File 
(Sapiro et al. 2004).  The ANES is primarily a repeated cross-sectional survey, conducted in 
1948 and every other year since 1952. ANES respondents are interviewed twice during 
presidential election years, once in the weeks prior to the election and again in the weeks 
following the election. In non-presidential election years, individuals are only interviewed once 
following the election. In addition to some demographic information, the ANES reports 
respondents’ turnout (based on self-reports of voting), employment status, state of residence, and 
provides measures of voters’ political information and their use of various forms of media.    
  In various years (1956-1960, 1972-1976, and 1992-1996), the ANES has a rarely-used 
panel component, in which the same people were interviewed across successive presidential 24 
 
years.  During these years the survey provides information about both voters’ level of political 
information and their exposure to media.  In presidential election years since 1968, the ANES 
includes a variable which reflects the ANES interviewer’s assessment of the respondent’s 
general level of information about politics and public affairs, based on the respondent’s answers 
to various questions over the course of the survey interview.  This measure is collected in both 
the pre-election and post-election interviews. The interviewer codes his assessment of the 
respondent’s level of political information on a five point scale ranging from “very high” to 
“very low”.  We define a respondent as being informed if the interviewer codes their information 
level as “very high” or “fairly high”.   
  The survey also reports a measure of a respondent’s exposure to campaign information 
from multiple media sources. This measure is available in all presidential elections years during 
the post-election interview from 1952 to 1996, except for 1988, and a handful of non-presidential 
election years. This Media Exposure Index summarizes how many of four different types of 
media (t.v., radio, magazines, newspapers) respondents report having gotten information from 
about the recently completed election.  We use observations for this index for which there are 
valid responses for each of the four discrete elements from which this element are constructed.   
We define the respondent as being informed if they accessed three or more of these media 
sources.     
 Table  8  presents estimates of the effect of employment on information and media 
exposure from individual ANES data.
 31 Column (1) presents results from pooled cross-section 
models across all available years.  Column (2) presents pooled cross-section estimates, but only 
for the ANES panel sample.  Column (3) shows the results from a difference model – estimated, 
of course, on the panel sample.
32 We find that in the pooled cross-section, being employed is 
very strong and positively correlated with being thought by the interviewer to be a politically 
                                                            
31 The media exposure index is only asked in a post-election survey, so there is an unavoidable slight discrepancy 
between the timing of the information questions and the labor supply measures.   
32 Comparisons of sample sizes between the interviewer’s assessment of respondent information (Panel A) and the 
Media Exposure Index (Panel B) must account for the higher rate of missing data for the Media Exposure Index 
arising from three sources. First, the media measures are based on respondent answers to four items while the 
interviewers provide an information assessment.  Second, the ANES used multiple survey forms in some years such 
that not all respondents were asked the same questions in a given year.  Roughly half of respondents were not asked 
the media questions in 1972 and roughly one-tenth were not asked in 1992.  Third, since 1988 the newspaper media 
question is only asked for those who first respond that they have read a newspaper during the past.  As an example 
of the impact on the sample sizes, the number of respondents providing valid observations in adjacent panel years 
for column (3) is 672 in 1972-76 and 574 in 1992-96 in Panel A and 644 in 1956-60, 316 in 1972-76, and 348 in 
1992-96 in Panel B. 25 
 
informed person, and with being rated highly on the Media Exposure index.  For the indicator of 
being politically informed, the pooled result is significant in both the full sample and in the panel 
sample.  For the media exposure measure, the pooled point estimate is significant in the full 
sample and large but not statistically different from zero in the panel sample.  These results seem 
inconsistent with the argument about information exposure, but they are undoubtedly 
contaminated by the presence of unobserved person effects,  i α , which likely impart positive bias 
to the estimates. 
The difference-estimator results shown in column (3) differ sharply from the naïve 
pooled estimates.  Once person-specific fixed effects are accounted for, we find that whether a 
person is informed about politics and his level of media exposure are both negatively related to 
his being employed, precisely as the argument linking leisure to information exposure predicts.  
The results suggest that employment and the two measures of information are positively 
associated with unobserved person-specific factors.  The estimated effects for gaining 
employment on being informed and for having a high level of media exposure are -.09 and -.07, 
respectively.  These are both relatively large compared to the means of the two variables of 0.44 
and 0.42.   These results provide evidence for the mechanism that we have argued best explains 
the various county-level turnout results.   
Although we have presented various turnout results using official vote totals, it would be 
appealing to supplement those findings with individual voting results from the ANES that 
correspond to the specifications in Table 8.   Unfortunately, several features of the information 
the ANES provides about voting makes this difficult or impossible.  One problem is that ANES 
information on turnout is based on respondents’ self-reports.  Voting self-reports have been 
shown to be quite unreliable (both in the ANES and elsewhere), with people reporting higher 
rates of turnout than suggested by official vote totals (see Katz and Katz 2000).  Indeed, the well-
known unreliability of individual turnout reports is one reason we use official county vote totals 
to study turnout in the preceding section.   The ANES has conducted a validation study, intended 
in part to measure the degree of mis-reporting of voting in the survey, which partially spans the 
panel years.  However, the validation information only verifies whether someone went to the 
polls at all; the data cannot be used to ascertain whether someone who reports voting for both, 
say, the presidential and House of Representative elections actually voted in only one of these 
elections when he went into the voting booth.   This is an important limitation, given our interest 26 
 
in differential behavior across election types.  Indeed, the survey does not inquire about 
gubernatorial voting at all over the years of the panel.
33    
We conclude our ANES analysis with some simple associational patterns that have not 
been presented in previous work, as far as we know.  The results do not directly test the 
argument relating labor supply to information, media exposure and turnout but they support the 
paper’s main argument and provide some corroboration of our key hypothesis.  The first bit of 
evidence examines the associational relationship between reported turnout, information and 
partisanship. Formal definitions of partisanship (Achen 2005) and intuition suggest that the more 
strongly a person identifies with a given political party the less likely he is to modify his relative 
preferences over candidates in the face of objective information about politics; candidates’ party 
identification effectively becomes all he needs to know to determine which candidate he most 
prefers. This implies that, while there should be a negative relationship between reported turnout 
and how informed the person is judged by an objective observer, the negative gradient should be 
larger for political moderates compared to more strongly partisan voters.    
ANES respondents report their political partisanship in a series of questions which are 
translated to a seven point scale, ranging from “Strong Democrat”=1, “Independent”=4, through 
“Strong Republican”=7.  The two graphs in Figure 2 show the share of respondents who reported 
having voted in the election, by the respondent’s self-reported partisanship and by their levels of 
interviewer-assessed political knowledge and media exposure.  The top two lines in each figure 
are the average reported turnout rate for informed and un-informed persons of the given 
partisanship type; the bottom line in each graph shows the difference in these two means, with 
95% confidence interval bands. The figure shows that better informed persons of each 
partisanship type were more likely to vote, by between 1.3 and 3.2 statistically significant 
percentage points.  The graphs also show that moderates are more sensitive to political 
information: the gap in turnout between informed and un-informed moderates is statistically 
larger than the corresponding gap for voters at the extremes of the partisanship distribution.   
                                                            
33 Despite these concerns, for robustness we estimated individual first difference results for self-reported ANES 
presidential voting (where the expected relationship is zero or very small), and self-reported ANES House of 
Representatives voting (which is likely especially affected by mis-reporting).   These individual-level Presidential 
results line up with the results from official vote totals.  The results for reported House of Representatives voting, 
unlike all of our other results, show no statistically significant relationship with labor market activity.   For reasons 
noted, we place little credence in these results.    
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These results are subject to the concerns we have raised about the reliability of reported turnout, 
but they are consistent with an information based account of voting. 
The second piece of associational evidence provides some individual-level corroboration 
for the argument we have made for why voting in presidential elections (unlike other contests) is 
not affected by labor market activity.   We have argued that this result makes sense in the context 
of an information-based model of voting if peoples’ knowledge about presidential contests is 
vastly superior to that for other elections, and if it is so close to perfect that less exposure to 
political information has scant effect on what people know.   We can test this argument directly.   
For different types of elections over several survey years, ANES respondents are asked to 
rate the candidates in the previous election contest.  This “thermometer” scale ranges from 0 to 
100.   We categorize respondents as not being able to “recall” a given candidate if when 
answering this question they either do not recognize the candidate’s name or they state that they 
cannot judge the candidate.  Valid numeric responses are categorized as “recalling” the 
candidate.  This is the only available measure of information differences across different types of 
elections and is available for multiple election types beginning in 1978. It is admittedly quite 
coarse and is not elicited for gubernatorial elections.  These shortcomings notwithstanding, we 
find that the share of respondents who can recall both candidates is 97%, 66% and 45%, 
respectively, for presidential, Senate and House elections.   Reassuringly, as we argued in the 
county turnout analysis, ignorance about candidates falls the “bigger” (meaning, the likely more 
intensely covered) the election.     
 
 
6.    Discussion and Conclusion  
This paper argues that voters’ labor market activity affects voting through two possible 
mechanisms: by changing the logistical costs associated with those actions; or by changing 
people’s exposure to political information by virtue of changes in their leisure time.  These two 
hypothesized mechanisms yield different predictions.  In particular, whereas the logistical cost 
mechanism suggests that turnout should decline with labor market activity in all elections, the 
information exposure argument suggests that while this relationship should be negative in 
general, it should be much smaller or even zero in elections like that for the President for which 28 
 
information in so widely available that reduced information exposure probably has little effect on 
knowledge.   Moreover, while the logistical cost argument makes no obvious prediction about 
roll-off (voting in only a subset of elections appearing on a given ballot), the information 
exposure and leisure mechanism implies that roll-off between any pair of elections should get 
larger as labor market activity increases. 
Analysis of turnout using county-level data and a variety of OLS and TSLS analyses 
finds evidence that is strongly consistent with the information exposure argument.  We find that 
increases in local per capita earnings and log employment per adult lead to reductions in voter 
turnout in gubernatorial elections and House of Representative voting, but has no effect on 
voting in presidential elections. We also show that for elections on the same ballot, for which the 
shoe-leather cost to vote on one is the same as the cost of voting on both, the gap between 
presidential and House of Representative voting widens with increases in labor market activity.  
Our findings are robust to a number of extensions and robustness tests, and we rule out 
alternative explanations for our findings, such as migration.  We also conduct individual-level 
analyses with data from the ANES.  We estimate individual panel models, which find that 
changes in labor supply are systematically negatively related to changes in media exposure and 
an objective measure of voters’ political knowledge.  Simple associational evidence further 
supports our main argument.  We show that the gap in turnout between informed and uninformed 
persons is largest for political moderates (people who might be expecte d  t o  r e l y  m o s t  o n  
information in forming their political judgments), and that information is, indeed, nearly always 
perfect in presidential elections compared to other contexts.  
Our work extends the burgeoning literature in economics and political economy on 
information and voting by focusing on a relationship that has received little previous attention. 
The results also suggest some directions for future work.  We have focused on the decision to 
vote – the most fundamental of voting actions – but our results raise interesting questions about 
whether the predictable variation in exposure to information occasioned by changes in labor 
market activity affects the behavior of other actors in the political market place.  For example, 
our analysis treats the information that agents are more or less exposed to because of variation in 
their labor market activity as exogenous.  However, if political actors can predict when voters 
have time to devote to activities that provide political information, this may have an effect of 
what information voters observe in equilibrium. For example, the type or amount of political 29 
 
advertising done might vary with predictable changes in voters’ leisure time, or the timing of 
controversial political decisions might be similarly strategically timed.    
The results may also have implications for future work linking labor market outcomes to 
other aspects of voting behavior.   A previous literature on “economic voting” tries to assess 
whether voters credit or blame political candidates for economic conditions by relating the 
incumbent’s vote share to aggregate measures of labor market activity.  Notably, this literature 
does not address the decision to vote in the first place, even though the vote share going a 
particular candidate obviously depends on which and how many voters turn out to vote.  Our 
various results suggest that whether economic conditions affect voters’ assessments of candidate 
quality or not, labor market conditions also affect turnout by changing voters’ exposure to 
political information, with effects that may differ between incumbents and relatively unknown 
challengers.  An important future challenge for the economic voting literature will thus be to 
formally incorporate the turnout decision into both theoretical and empirical analyses of the vote 
share, and perhaps to explore the importance of the knowledge/uncertainty mechanism we 
discuss in this paper for why one type of candidate might be preferred relative to another in votes 
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 Table 1.  Average County Voter Turnout by Election Types, and Average County 
Labor Market Conditions.  1969-2000 Elections, for All Counties and Counties 
in Oil and Coal States.
Counties in Oil 




   Mean  .427 .417
   Std. Dev. .109 .113
   # elections 348 76
   # of elections in Pres. Yrs 74 20
Presidential
   Mean  .548 .556
   Std. Dev. .095 .079
   # elections 376 70
B: Economic Measures
Per capita earnings
  Mean 17.5 15.1
  Std. Dev. 10.1 5.7
Employment per adult
  Mean .757 .728
  Std. Dev. .218 .169
# County/Years 47446 11996
Data drawn from multiple sources on aggregate voting data.
"Oil" are those in which 1% of 1974 from oil and gas workers. 
"Coal" States are four states in the "coal seam": WV, KY, PA, OH.   See text for details.
All Counties
(All Years)Table 2.  The Effect of Local Economic Performance on Voter Participation: County-Level Regresssions for All Counties
 in U.S.  for 1969-2000 Elections.   Pooled OLS and First-Difference (Change Since Last Election) Models.
Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Local Labor Market
Measure
(1)  Log per capita Earnings .031 -.032 -.013 .043 .001 .0003
(.005) (.012) (.005) (.007) (.007) (.004)
(2)  Log Employment per adult .041 -.060 -.008 .054 -.016 .009
(.009) (.029) (.007) (.012) (.013) (.007)
Year Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
State Effects Yes No No Yes No No
State*Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Poplulation Share Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22299 19998 19998 24073 21058 21058
Each point estimate in table represents results from a different regression. 
Standard errors account for arbitrary forms of clustering within states.
Counties are "medium" if share of employment in oil/coal at least 5% but less than 20%; "large" if share > 20%
All regressions control for Change Since Last Election in: Total Population; % Population Female; % Population: 
Black, Race "Other";  % Population Aged 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s, 70+ 
Governor President
Difference Models Difference ModelsTable 3.  OLS Estimates of Effect Oil and Coal Supply Shocks on Change Since Last Election in County Labor Market Outcomes 
and Change in County Voter Participation for 1969-1990 Elections.  
Governor President Governor President Governor President
Oil/Coal  Supply Shock:
(∆ log Nat. Coal Emp) X I(Medium_Coal_1974) .108 .205 .080 .067 -.014 .018
(.029) (.045) (.024) (.015) (.010) (.008)
(∆ log Nat. Coal Emp)  X I(Large_Coal_1974) .281 .340 .114 .152 -.022 .004
(.073) (.114) (.014) (.020) (.011) (.006)
(∆ log Nat. Oil Emp) X I(Medium_Oil_1974) .041 .029 .024 .007 -.006 -.005
(.011) (.020) (.007) (.018) (.004) (.003)
(∆ log Nat. Oil Emp) X I(Large_Oil_1974) .153 .120 .060 .051 -.035 -.0002
(.028) (.033) (.014) (.022) (.005) (.006)
State*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Stat on Oil/Coal Instrument  13.4 10.9 19.5 17.4
Observations 4751 4412 4753 4412 4751 4666
Standard errors account for arbitrary forms of clustering within states.
Counties are "medium" if share of employment in oil/coal at least 5% but less than 20%; "large" if share > 20%
All regressions control for Change Since Last Election in: Total Population; % Population Female; % Population: Black, Race "Other";  % Population Aged 
30s, 40s, 50s, 60s, 70+ 
A. ∆ County per log Capita 
Annual Earnings 
B. ∆ County log Employment 
per Adult 
C. ∆ Voter TurnoutTable 4.  OLS and TSLS Estimates of Effect of Change in County-Level Labor Market Outcomes on Change in 
Voter Turnout.  Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections from 1969-1990 in "Oil" and "Coal" States.
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS
(1)    Log per capita Earnings -.029 -.138 -.004 .033
(.008) (.047) (.003) (.027)
(2)     Log Employment per adult -.040 -.318 .008 .068
(.012) (.105) (.012) (.066)
State*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instruments for TSLS Models: National Oil/Coal Employment * I(County "medium"/"large")
Observations 4751 4751 4412 4412
Each point estimate in table represents results from a different regression. 
Standard errors account for arbitrary forms of clustering within states.
Counties are "medium" if share of employment in oil/coal at least 5% but less than 20%; "large" if share > 20%
All regressions control for Change Since Last Election in: Total Population; % Population Female; % Population: 
Black, Race "Other";  % Population Aged 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s, 70+ 
Governor PresidentTable 5.  Estimates of Effect of Local Labor Market Conditions on Presidential/Congressional "Roll-Off"    
(Share of County Voting in Presidential Election - Share of County Voting in House Election on Same Ballot).   
Outcome: Presidential - Congressional Vote Share
TSLS First Difference
Estimates
Sample All Counties Oil and Coal Counties  Oil and Coal Counties 
Local Labor Market Measure
(1)  Log per capita Earnings .012 .024 .091
(.004) (.013) (.049)
(2)  Log per capita Employment .019 .071 .195
(.013) (.039) (.162)
State*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Years of Data 1972-2000 1972-88 1972-88
Weighted Mean of LEVEL .037 .046 .046
of Dependent Variable
Observations 19056 3836 3836
Each point estimate in table represents results from a different regression.  
Standard errors account for arbitrary forms
All regressions control for total Population; % Population Female; % Population: Black, Race "Other";  % Population aged
30s, 40s, 50s, 60s, 70+ 
See Data Appendix for details about  House elections county data.
OLS First Difference
 Estimates Table 6.  OLS Estimates of Effect of State Economic Area (SEA)-Level and Economic Sub -Region-Level
Economic Performance on Voter Participation:  Regressions for all SEAs and ESRs in U.S. for 1969-2000
Elections.  First-Difference (Change Since Last Election) Models.
SEA ESR SEA ESR
(1)    Log per capita Earnings -.027 -.046 .002 -.001
(.011) (.013) (.009) (.010)
(2)    Log Employment per adult -.027 -.047 .010 .021
(.018) (.032) (.014) (.022)
Year Effects No No No No
State*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3058 1581 3191 1666
Each point estimate represents results from a different regression.  
Standard errors account for arbitrary forms of clustering within states.
All regressions control for Change Since Last Election in: Total Population; % Population Female; % Population: 
Black, Race "Other";  % Population Aged 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s, 70+ 
Governor PresidentTable 7.  OLS Estimates of Whether Change in Share of County's Residents Living Outside County and Outside State 
Five Years Before, Differs across "Large", "Medium" and "Small" Production Counties in Oil and Coal States
over Energy Shock "Boom" and "Bust".
1970 to 1980 1980 to 1990 1970 to 1980 1980 to 1990
Importance of Oil/Coal  in County:
I(Medium_Coal_1974) .010 -.022 .001 -.013
(.005) (.004) (.004) (.002)
I(Large_Coal_1974) .001 -.025 -.0003 -.016
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.004)
I(Medium_Oil_1974) .022 -.020 .001 .002
(.005) (.005) (.007) (.005)
I(Large_Oil_1974) -.0001 -.047 .001 -.017
(.004) (.005) (.002) (.007)
State*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Stat on Oil/Coal Shock  (P-Value) 7.2 (0.0028) 33.5 (0.0001) 0.1 (0.9634) 13.1 (0.0002)
Observations 1103 1103 1103 1103
Standard errors account for arbitrary forms of clustering within states.
Counties are "medium" if share of employment in oil/coal at least 5% but less than 20%; "large" if share > 20%
A. ∆ County Residents who Living 
Outside County Five Years Prior
B. ∆ County Residents who Living 
Outside State Five Years PriorTable 8.  OLS and Within Individual-Level Estimates of Effect of Being Employed on 
Alternative Measures of Political Information and Media Exposure  in the   
American National Election Study.
(1) (2) (3)
Within Estimator
Full Sample Panel Sample Panel Sample
A:
(Mean of Dep. Variable: 0.38 full sample; 0.44 panel sample)
R. Employed? .069 .050 -.091
(.008)                          (.026)                    (.038)                           








# Observations 19227 2492 2492
# Unique Respondents 1246
B:
(Mean of Dep. Variable: 0.49 full sample; 0.50 panel sample)
R. Employed? .030 .019 -.076
(.010)                          (.021)                    (.043)                           








# Observations 16802 2616 2616
# Unique Respondents 1308
All Regressions Include Constant Term, State*Year Fixed Effects, Age, Age-Squared.  
OLS regressions also include dummy variables for whether Respondent Male.
All Regressions weighted using ANES sample weights. 
Data from Multiple Years of American National Elections Study.  See text for details.
Pooled OLS
Interviewer reports R's general level of information about politics/public 
affairs
ANES Media Exposure Index "high": R exposed to political campaign on 3 
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B. By Respondent Media ExposureData Appendix   
Matching Across Data Sources 
Matching the data from the various sources was facilitated by the use of county FIPS codes. 
Merging was based on the modified FIPS codes used by the REIS. These county FIPS codes are 
generally the same as the standard FIPS codes with the exception that many independent cities in 
Virginia are merged with neighboring counties to create new “counties”. Since most data sources 
contain separate observations for these independent cities, these observations are first 
summarized according to the definitions of these new counties and then merged by the REIS 
FIPS codes. (Independent cities in Maryland, Missouri, and Nevada appear as separate 
observations in the REIS data and thus require no further adjustment.) 
The voting data available from ICPSR uses the ICPSR county codes as opposed to the FIPS 
county codes. A bridge file between FIPS and ICPSR county codes is used to connect the ICPSR 
files with the remaining data sources. 
To address a small number of counties which are involved in either a merge or a split during our 
sample period, we only use observations for these counties from the after the merge or split.  
Counties which split during the sample period are Yuma, AZ (creating La Paz, AZ in 1983) and 
Valencia, NM (forming Cibola, NM in 1981).  Counties which merged during this period are 
Washbaugh, SD and Jackson, SD in 1976 as well as Nansemond, VA and Suffolk City, VA.  In 
addition, a few cities in Virginia annexed parts of surrounding counties including Roanoke City, 
VA (annexed part of Roanoke county in 1975), Petersburg City, VA (annexed parts of Dinwiddie, 
VA and Prince George, VA in 1972), and Lynchburg City, VA (annexed parts of Bedford, VA 
and Campbell,VA in 1975). 
 
County-Level Voting Data 
We use county-level voting totals found from three primary sources.  For 1969-1990, we use data 
from ICPSR study no. 13 “General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990”.  For 
subsequent years, Presidential, Senatorial, and Gubernatorial returns were obtained from the CQ 
Press Voting and Elections Collection while the Congressional returns were obtained from 
Election Data Services, Inc. 
We made a number of adjustments to these voting returns to account for incomplete and apparent 
incorrect data. First, since the ICPSR data are available for even-numbered years only prior 1980, 
gubernatorial elections which occur in odd-numbered year are, for the most part, not found in the 
ICPSR data. Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Virginia have odd year governor 
elections. These data were obtained from the CQ Press Voting and Elections Collection. 
However, for some odd-year elections prior to 1972, the election results are incorrectly entered 
into an adjacent even year. These observations were moved to the appropriate years. 
Second, in some instances all of the data for a single state for a given election during the period in 
which the ICPSR data is the primary source was replaced with data from CQ either due to  
 
missing data or numerous suspicious values.  A list of these elections is available from the 
authors. 
A small fraction of individual counties in each year have data that apparent most likely because of 
incorrect coding. In some instances, these errors appear to be due to a switch in values for 
observations which appear consecutively in the alphabetized county list. In other instances, the 
data were incorrectly entered.  A list of these counties and elections which have individual 
election problems that were corrected is available from the authors.  In addition, for 
Congressional election data, we investigated the individual county returns whenever the overall 
total number of votes recorded for a state in a given year did not match the total number found on 
the Election Information webpage for the Clerk of the House of Representatives 
(http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/index.html). 
We also drop observations due to a lack reported votes on election data.  We do not use Louisiana 
in our analysis since elections in the state during this period except Presidential elections are 
subject to a non-partisan primary in which all candidates from both parties are on the same 
primary ballot.  A run-off election is held between the top two vote getters, regardless of party, 
unless one of the candidates receives at least 50% of the vote in the primary in which case they 
are declared the winner.  Since the final election varies may not be held on the standard 
nationwide general election day, we exclude Louisiana from all of our analysis.  We also drop 
states in the roll-off analysis that do not report vote totals in uncontested elections which include 
Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, and Oklahoma.  In addition, due to a lack of available county-level 
Congressional returns in many years, we do not use Pennsylvania in the roll-off elections either. 
Finally, there are two elections that meet all of criteria discussed above or earlier in the text that 
we still drop. The Arkansas 1990 Senate election is dropped because counties do not report vote 
totals due to the fact under state law election results for unopposed elections need not be reported.  
The Georgia 1992 Senate final election was a runoff election held on November 24
th since no 
candidate received at least 50 percent of the vote on November 3
rd. 
 
Defining Coal and Oil States and County Employment Share in Oil and Coal  
We construct a measure of the importance of the oil and gas industry and the coal industry in the 
various counties within these states using County Business Patterns (CBP). Since 1974, CBP data 
have been based on the Census Bureau's Standard Statistical Establishment List.  Because of the 
risk of disclosing firm specific information, exact employment numbers for two-digit industries 
such as coal and oil and gas are not available at the county-level.  However, the CBP provides 
county-level information on both the number of firms in each two-digit industry and the number 
of firms that fall into a specific firm-size category (e.g., 20 to 49 employees) for these industries. 
By weighting the number of firms in a firm-size category by the mid-point of the number of 
employees in that category, we create an estimate of the number of employees in each two-digit 
industry at the county-level. We then create county-level estimated employment shares by 
industry as the ratio of the estimated industry employment to the estimated total county  
 
employment where the total county employment is also estimated by using the firm-size 
methodology. 
CBP data for 1970-1976 were obtained from UCLA's Institute for Social Science Research Data 
Archive through the kind help of Libbie Stephenson. CBP Data for 1977-1996 and 1998-1999 
was obtained from ICPSR with the remaining years being obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.   
CBP data for 1967 were obtained from the University of Wisconsin's Data and Information 
Services Center through the kind help of Cynthia Severt. 
 
Microdata from the American National Election Survey (ANES) 
We use microdata from the 1948-2004 American National Election Studies (ANES) Cumulative 
Data File (Sapiro et al. 2004) which is ICPSR Study no. 8475.  For our cross-sectional analysis, 
we restrict the sample to observations with non-missing data for gender, age, and employment 
status.  For our panel analysis, it is important to note that the ANES includes one observation per 
household in each survey although that the same individual from the household may not be 
interviewed in all both periods.  We use the following approach to link individuals the two 
observations for an individual which are spaced four years apart.  We first use the unique 
household identifier variable VCF0006A to link observations from the same household across the 
two survey waves.  We then only use linked observations for the same household if a) the 
respondent’s gender is the same across both waves and b) the difference in the respondent’s age 
between the two survey waves is within two years of the expected four year age difference (i.e., 
the age change is between two and six years).  The respondent’s gender is the same in over 99 
percent of the linked household observations while the age difference is between two and six 
years in over 96 percent of the linked household observations (over 93% of the age differences 
are between three and five years while 81% of observations have exactly a four year age 
difference). 
 
Census County-Level Migration Data 
We obtain county-level migration rates using the Summary Tape File 4 data of the 1970, 1980, 
and 1990 Censuses, made available through the National Historical Geographic Information 
System. In each of these Census years, a sample of households is asked whether each household 
member lived in the same house five years before the Census date and, for each one that did not, 
the county, state, and/or country of residence five years earlier is ascertained.  The fraction of the 
population sampled for this question is 15% in 1970, ~19% in 1980, and ~17% in 1990.  The 
Census Bureau then creates county-level estimates on the number of migrants based on these 
responses.  The full Census is used to enumerate the number of persons ages 5 and over that 
reside in the county as of the Census date.  The Census Bureau imputes age and place of 
residence five years earlier if the necessary information is missing or incomplete on the Census 
form.  We only use the non-allocated (i.e., non-imputed) counts to compute county-level 
migration rates. Percent of 1974 CBP Share of 1967 CMI Share of
1974 CBP mining establishments mining establishments
Employment
from Mining Oil and Gas Coal Oil and Gas Coal
Wyoming 15.8% 77% 5% 81% 4%
West Virginia 13.3% 40% 53% 40% 57%
New Mexico 7.8% 82% 1% 82% 2%
Louisiana 5.9% 88% 0% 92% 0%
Montana 4.3% 66% 5% 66% 5%
Kentucky 4.3% 16% 74% 28% 60%
Arizona 4.1% 21% 2% 22% 1%
Alaska 3.9% 70% 3% 59% 4%
Oklahoma 3.9% 90% 1% 94% 1%
Utah 3.7% 47% 5% 36% 10%
Texas 3.2% 88% 0% 94% 0%
Colorado 2.2% 58% 6% 50% 11%
Nevada 2.1% 14% N/A 11% 0%
Kansas 1.8% 85% 1% 86% 1%
South Dakota 1.7% 21% N/A 22% 4%
Idaho 1.6% 10% N/A 1% 0%
Virginia 1.4% 4% 67% 1% 78%
Pennsylvania 1.2% 25% 50% 26% 56%
North Dakota 1.2% 65% 15% 63% 19%
Mississippi 1.1% 81% N/A 81% 0%
Minnesota 1.1% 9% 1% 3% 0%
Alabama 1.0% 23% 34% 15% 44%
Arkansas 0.8% 66% 3% 67% 4%
Tennessee 0.7% 9% 41% 5% 39%
Ohio 0.7% 39% 20% 40% 22%
Notes: States in bold are "Oil States" in our analysis; States in italics are "Coal States"
Appendix Table 1 -Top Twenty Five Mining States By 1974 CBP Employment Shares
found in: found in:Appendix Table 2.  TSLS Estimates of Change in County Labor Market Outcomes on Change in Voter Turnout under Alternative   
Specifications of Oil and Coal Shock Instruments.
Endogenous Regressor Endogenous Regressor Endogenous Regressor



















1. (∆ National Coal/Oil Employment ) X -.067 -.113 -.042 -.079 .041 .078
     I("medium", "large" Oil/Coal 1967) (.026)                 (.064)                    (.022)                    (.087)                    (.024)                  (.057)                    
    F-Stat on Excluded Instuments 17.4 49.1 13.3 44.3 6.2 29.8
2. (∆ Coal/Oil Price ) X -.171 -.352 -.044 -.099 .050 .113
     I("medium", "large" Oil/Coal 1974) (.029)                 (.080)                    (.046)                    (.134)                    (.048)                  (.114)                    
    F-Stat on Excluded Instuments 27.8 38.0 13.7 27.7 15.6 87.2
3. (∆ Oil/Coal Price) X -.157 -.286 -.027 -.078 .068 .127
     I("medium", "large" Oil/Coal 1967) (.033)                 (.077)                    (.036)                    (.078)                    (.032)                  (.073)                    
    F-Stat on Excluded Instuments 19.4 35.3 16.3 15.0 15.1 47.5
State*Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4751 4753 6014 6016 4412 4414
Each point estimate in table represents results from a different regression.   Standard errors account for arbitrary forms of clustering within states.
Counties are "medium" if share of employment in oil/coal at least 5% but less than 20%; "large" if share > 20%
All regressions control for Change Since Last Election in: Total Population; % Population Female; % Population: Black, Race "Other";  % Population Aged 
30s, 40s, 50s, 60s, 70+ 
Governor Senate PresidentAppendix Figure 1.  Distribution of Small, Medium and Large Producing Counties in "Oil" and 
"Coal" States.